About the alleged performative contradiction of animal ethics:

on Le complexe des trois singes, by Étienne Bimbenet

Abstract

In this work, we will attempt to provide an analysis of Étienne Bimbenet’s rejection of sensocentric animal ethics. In section 1, we will present the main tenets of the book, among which we will focus on the one according to which animal ethics commits a performative contradiction. In section 2, we will identify the basis on which Bimbenet hinges to make this accusation: the claim, allegedly made by Donaldson and Kymlicka, that human reason is “not essential” for ethics−which would contradict the fact that their proposal is itself a rational enterprise. Given that all the authors are doing in the passages Bimbenet criticizes is to distinguish the conditions for being the object of moral consideration from those for being a moral subject, we will search, in section 3, for further evidence of the contradiction. As we will argue, a deeper reading of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s proposal shows that they are aware of the intellectual character of their work.