Analysis of the death damage in animals through the abolitionism and welfarism debate
Keywords:
abolitionism, welfarism, death, self-awarenessAbstract
The moral consideration of nonhuman animals impels us to adopt a position regarding their exploitation. According to Gary Francione, the theoretical dimension of the problem offers two possible positions: the welfarist and the abolitionist. One of the key arguments defended by the
welfarist position is that death is not something harmful for animals devoid of self-awareness. Thus, it would not be strictly necessary to abolish their exploitation, as long as their interests are respected, essentially their interest in not suffering. This is questionable, however. In order to
demonstrate it, the present article takes into consideration Francione’s criticism of the two most celebrated animal ethics philosophers: Peter Singer and Tom Regan.
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