The right of non-human animals from the perspective of the politics of needs

Abstract

In Argentina, animal protection laws punish mistreatment, damage and suffering caused to them unnecessarily. In this way, even when it claims to protect animals, law constitutes a guarantee of its domination by man and naturalizes its superiority. This work then invites us to ask who, how and on the basis of what defines the unnecessaryness or necessity of suffering or punishment. Based on the work of Nancy Fraser, this work suggests that it is not only in question (that is, subject to interpretation) who should be responsible for the satisfaction of needs, but also how to conceive and define what those needs are, who interprets them, from what perspective and in light of what interests. Reopening these discussions, which are closed by a disinterested hegemonic discourse of their problematization, can lead to a struggle between different interpretations, plausible to give rise to a new conception of animal protection. To do that, the law must face a key dilemma. By definition, the law seeks to minimize the margin for interpretation and, consequently, reduce when not closing the spaces of struggle for interpretations. This paradox of law as a depoliticizer of the struggle for rights opens a question: how could the law "open" the discussion on rights to become a public problem, without putting itself in question as a carrier of truth?