Theoretical contributions to the discussion on non-human animals as subjects of law

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to argue in favor of the declaration of legal personhood for non-human animals. Moreover, as part of the argumentation, I will make reference to Will Kymlicka’s reasons to open a third articulating axis in relation to the two classical strategies of activists and animal rights researchers: i.e. legal personhood of concrete animals versus partial reforms concerning legal regiments of exploration without discussing its status of thing. In the first part of this paper I will address some minor issues that may be considered as obstacles to the legal personhood declaration for non-human animals, the problem of the meaning of the words; then I will work with Carlos Nino and his law theory, with special attention regarding to the question of interpretation. In the second part, we will explain the underlying cause regarding the refusal to consider animals as subjects of law, i.e. speciesism, and how this is a morally unjustified position. Finally, and briefly, we will refer to Kymlicka's ideas on animals as citizens and on the new strategies that people who are not involved in the animal liberation movement do, and how these could be a prelude to a new path through the end of the exploration.