A death of nonhuman animals on Peter Singer’s new Hedonistic Utilitarianism

Abstract

Peter Singer has transitioned from a partially preferentialist to a fully hedonistic version of utilitarianism. That change has prompted a revision of his views about the death of nonhuman animals. Where he previously claimed that only individuals who could project themselves into the future (most humans and some nonhumans) could be harmed by death and had an interest in living, he now concedes that death is bad for all sentient individuals with a future of net positive experiences. Singer, however, has not yet developed two significant issues: whether the prudential value of an individual’s future must be assessed in a time-neutral or in a time-relative way; and whether our reasons not to kill an individual are given by said prudential value or by the value of her future impersonally conceived. In this contribution, I argue that Singer must opt for a time-neutral account and an impersonal view of the badness of death. Thus, our reasons not to kill nonhuman animals, and to prevent them from dying, are as strong as the ones against killing typical human adults in similar circumstances. Finally, I explore the implications of this position for our obligations regarding animals under human exploitation and those living in the wild.