METAPHYSICAL SUFFICIENCY IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEGAL PERSON IN THE HIGHER PRIMATES
Keywords:
non-human person, zoo, great primates, welfareAbstract
In the last decade, difficulties have arisen in justifying the recognition of higher primates kept in captivity in zoos around the world as nonhuman person. We proposed that it is necessary to address a sufficient condition under which we could call them person, based on the metaphysical or psychological interpretation of the concept characterized by the neo-Lockean perspective, and currently widespread in bioethical discussions. The fact that higher primates hold the title of person implies that the various unpleasant experiences they may have in captivity negatively influence their past, present, and future well-being, since these animals possess a concept of their existence that is not limited solely to the present.
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